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Introduction  
The goal of this paper is to study the impact of the microfinance methodologies on the 
portfolio risk, portfolio yield and the profitability of microfinance institutions by comparing 
the subgroups of the microfinance institutions which use different methodologies. In general 
microfinance institutions differ from one another in terms of the lending methodologies. 
These microfinance institutions can be divided up to several groups according to the 
methodologies such as institutions targeting women, institutions providing group loans, 
institutions serving rural areas, institutions providing individual loans only etc. 
Methodologies, which this paper focuses on, are group lending, targeting women borrowers 
and lending to rural borrowers (where social bound is expected to be stronger due to 
borrowers’ interdependency). However, it is useful to note that only microfinance institutions 
are involved in this research, thus only relative effectiveness of such methodologies is to be 
studied. The outcome of this study, therefore, can only suggest how effective the studied 
methodologies are in comparison to the rest of microfinance institutions. It does not say 
anything about how effective these methodologies are in comparison with the conventional 
banking in terms of portfolio risk. For instance, individual loan in microfinance terms could 
mean a different product thanks to the alternative approach to collateral. 
Empirical model  
As stated above this study seeks to test whether the implementation of group loan, targeting 
women or village lending decreases or at least avoids the increase of risk of portfolio. Even 
though these methodologies are the main subject of this paper, other institutional factors and 
macroeconomic variables are also important in determining the risk. 
The following hypotheses are made in this paper and are subject to research: 
Hypothesis 1: Group lending decreases the default risk of the portfolio. 
Armendáriz and Morduch (2005) suggest that group lending decrease the risk of default 
thanks to the formation of groups with individuals of the same type. That is risky borrowers 
form groups with risky borrowers and safe borrowers with same borrowers. The Grameen 
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Bank is based mainly on this idea. However, Gine, Karlan, Jakiela and Morduch (2005) show 
in their experimental study of microfinance that group loan may actually make the borrower 
to take on riskier projects than they would otherwise choose. Authors argue that group lending 
facilitate profitable risk taking while maintain high rates of loan repayment. In other words, 
implicit insurance mechanism imposed by group loan helps avoid greater default risk for the 
whole group. 
Hypothesis 2: targeting women borrowers can help reduce the portfolio risk. 
Targeting the woman borrowers is one of the building blocks of microfinance. Women are 
deemed to be more reliable and responsible borrowers than men (Armendáriz and Morduch 
(2005)). According to these authors, we should be able to see better repayment rate or lower 
portfolio risk with the increase of portion of women borrower. Also Barr and Kinsey (2002) 
found in their study that men are more likely to behave anti-socially, which may be the cause 
of lower repayment rate by men. 
Hypothesis 3: activities in rural areas are expensive. Therefore, it is likely to decrease the 
performance in terms of portfolio risk, portfolio yield and profitability. 
Lending to rural population has always been a struggle e.g. due to the density of the 
population. Low density and weak infrastructure could lead to poor screening, monitoring and 
collection activities. However, it might not always be true that rural lending will lead to 
negative results in terms of portfolio risk thanks to the innovations such as village banking.  
Hypothesis 4: Good governance can lead to better performance in terms of portfolio risk and 
earning performance. 
Papers such as Coleman and Osei (2008), and Mersland and Strom (2009) argue that good 
governance contribute to good performance. In contrast to these authors, we will use as an 
indicator of good governance the legal entity of individual microfinance institutions. 
Armendáriz and Morduch (2005) point out that the non-profit bodies are less successful in 
enforcing the loan conditions and managing the portfolio risk. Moreover, Dokulilová, Janda 
and Zetek (2009) point out that MFIs face problems in areas such as ethics, management, 
legal entity and other uncontrollable surroundings. Therefore, we will test the hypothesis that 
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the banks and non-bank financial institutions are most effective and NGOs are the least 
effective in terms of portfolio management and earning performance. 
Based on the hypotheses the following dependent and independent variables are chosen and 
the first empirical model to be studied is as follows. 
𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑒𝑟_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑒𝑟_𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + δ1𝑛𝑏𝑓𝑖𝑖 + δ2𝑐𝑢𝑖
+ δ3𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘3 + 𝜃𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
Table 1: Dependent and independent variables explained 
Dependent and independent 
variables 
Description  
𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 The portfolio risk of microfinance institution i 
in country j in period t 
𝑝𝑒𝑟_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 Percent of outstanding loans disbursed as 
group loans by institution i in country j in 
period t 
𝑝𝑒𝑟_𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 Percent of outstanding loans made to rural 
customers by institution i in country j in period 
t 
𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 Percent of women borrowers in institution i in 
country j in period t 
𝑛𝑏𝑓𝑖𝑖 Dummy for institutions in the form of nonbank 
financial institution 
𝑐𝑢𝑖 Dummy for credit unions 
𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 Dummy for banks 
𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 Number of outstanding borrowers 
𝑎𝑣𝑒_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 Average loan size in USD for institution i in 
country j in period t 
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑗𝑡 Growth rate of the economy in country j in 
period t 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 Inflation in country j in period t 
In this study as a measure of the risk of MFI is used a ratio of loans overdue by more than 30 
days to the total loan portfolio, which is called portfolio at risk (PAR>30). First of 
independent variables are the percent of outstanding loan disbursed in a group loan form, the 
percent of outstanding loans disbursed to rural customers, the share of women borrowers 
served by the i-th microfinance institution in county j in time t, and dummies for the legal 
5 
 
form of microfinance i. The constant of the regression α represents the average risk of 
portfolio lent to men for all the microfinance institutions in the form of NGO given that only 
individual and non-rural loans are disbursed when other institutional and macroeconomic 
variables are controlled for. Vectors of coefficients β and δ are of the major interest in this 
study.  
𝛽 = (𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛽3); 𝛿 = (𝛿1, 𝛿2, 𝛿3) 
𝛽1 is expected to be non-positive under assumption that group lending is effective in reducing 
the level of the risk. The reason for an expected non-positive or not a negative sign is the fact 
that individual loans in this study are actually microfinance loans. As microfinance individual 
loans are compared to group loans we can accept non-positive sign as success. The coefficient 
𝛽2 is associated with rural lending and expected to be positive due to the difficulty to operate 
in rural areas. As women borrowers are said to be more responsible, a greater presence of 
women among borrowers should drive the average level of risk down. Therefore, 𝛽3 is 
expected to have a negative sign.  
 
All of the δs are expected to have negative signs since NBFIs, CUs and banks are expected to 
have better governance thanks to their profit driven operations. Banks are expected to perform 
the best among all forms among others due to its size, which enables better diversification. 
Credit unions are expected to have in magnitude the second large coefficient because they can 
receive savings which can facilitate financial behavior of the borrowers. NBFIs are expected 
to perform somewhat better than NGOs as NBFIs are expected to make profits. 
𝜃 is a vector of coefficients for institutional and macroeconomic variables. Institutional 
characteristics, which can have impact on the risk, are the number of borrowers of each 
microfinance institution, an average loan size of the each institution and average yield. As 
these microfinance institutions are subject to economic environment in different countries, 
macroeconomic variables in country j in t period such as economic growth and inflation 
(represented by deflator) need to be controlled. Rewriting the empirical model from the half 
vector form will result in:  
𝜃 = (𝜃1, 𝜃2, 𝜃3, 𝜃4); 
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𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑒𝑟_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑒𝑟_𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + δ1𝑛𝑏𝑓𝑖𝑖 + δ2𝑐𝑢𝑖
+ δ3𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 + 𝜃1𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑎𝑣𝑒_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃4𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
The number of outstanding borrowers of microfinance institution i in country j in period t is 
represented by the variable 𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡. We assume that the bigger the portfolio gets the more 
it will be diversified. Therefore, the sign of 𝜃1 is expected to be negative. Another 
institutional variable 𝑎𝑣𝑒_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 is an average loan size. The expected sign of the coefficient 
for this variable is ambiguous as smaller loans can be easier to repay and, however, at the 
same time smaller loans will not allow entrepreneurial activities in a greater extent, thus 
lowering the borrowers’ ability to repay.  
Variable 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑗𝑡 is the growth rate of the economy. When the economy is running 
smoothly and growing, also the businesses of microfinance borrowers are expected to thrive, 
which means the earnings of borrowers should increase and thus the likelihood of default 
should decrease. Therefore, the expected sign for the coefficient is negative. The last variable 
– GDP deflator represents inflation in the economy. The effect of inflation on the low income 
borrowers seem to be ambiguous. Inflation is known to have reallocating effect in favor of 
borrowers. However, this is valid only if the earnings of the borrowers rise with inflation fast 
enough.  
Data 
The data used in this research is collected from an open database MIX Market where 
microfinance institutions upload their financial information and other microfinance related 
information. Because MIX Market platform does not allow complex work with the data 
uploaded, the data was be manually downloaded and recompiled to fit the research goal we 
have imposed. Moreover, World Bank databank was used for macroeconomic data. The data 
is enclosed in an electronic form on a CD-ROM that can be found at the back of this paper. 
The consequent data used for the research is an unbalanced panel data of 90 microfinance 
institutions in the proximity of the Central Asian region over the period from 1998 to 2011. It 
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should be noted that the this time frame is kept only because of the fact that macros, which 
were used to rework the raw data, were set for this period at the beginning and in fact most of 
the observations are missing for the early years. However, this should represent a big issue as 
the statistical program used for analyses is capable of removing observations that have 
missing entries. The countries where the studied microfinance institutions operate are China, 
Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan. 
Microfinance institutions from these countries were chosen according to the completeness of 
the data they provide on MIX Market. Descriptive statistics for the compiled, after removal of 
certain errors, are presented in the following table. Two observations had values which were 
out of the possible range for per_group and per_rural.  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Number of 
observations 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
par 532 0.029 0.058 0 0.477 
yield 342 0.354 0.152 0.053 1.142 
roa 472 0.033 0.124 -1.045 0.405 
per_group 352 0.159 0.310 0 0.998 
per_rural 352 0.247 0.353 0 1 
female 531 0.513 0.246 0.019 1 
num_bor 595 15625 39921 4 411833 
ave_size 592 2477.18 8786.92 0 171473.4 
growth 1138 0.083 0.057 -0.019 0.345 
inflation 1138 0.142 0.135 -0.188 0.878 
As a result of incomplete data provided by MFIs the number of observations for the individual 
variables varies greatly. Despite this, the size of observation appears to be sufficient for 
answering the research questions. 
As we see in the table above the highest portfolio at risk over 30 days is around 48 percent 
while the average portfolio at risk is 2.9 percent. Furthermore, the statistics reveal that there 
are microfinance institutions which offer only individual loans and also institutions operating 
solely in urban areas. Microfinance institutions studied range from very small to large in 
terms of the number of outstanding borrowers. 
As stated before, the data is for 90 MFIs from the proximity of Central Asia. Below is the list 
of these MFIs which are included in this study. 
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Table 3: The list of MFIs 
MFID Name Country Type 
1 CFPA China NGO 
2 CZWSDA  China NGO 
3 Patra hunchun China NGO 
4 ARDPAS China NGO 
5 Patra yanbian China NGO 
6 Microcred-Nanchong China NBFI 
7 Rishlenglong China NBFI 
8 Harbin Bank China Bank 
9 Khan Bank Mongolia Bank 
10 Credit Mongol Mongolia NBFI 
11 Xac Bank Mongolia Bank 
12 VFM Mongolia NBFI 
13 TFS Mongolia NBFI 
14 Hugjil badrah Mongolia NBFI 
15 KMF Kazakhstan NBFI 
16 FCF Shymkent Kazakhstan NBFI 
17 Bereke Kazakhstan NGO 
18 A-invest Kazakhstan NBFI 
19 ORTA Nesie Kazakhstan NBFI 
20 FFSA Kazakhstan NBFI 
21 Arnur Credit Kazakhstan NBFI 
22 NKCK LLC Kazakhstan NBFI 
23 KFOND Kazakhstan NBFI 
24 TAT Senim Kazakhstan NBFI 
25 PF Damu Kazakhstan NBFI 
26 MCO OZAT Kazakhstan NBFI 
27 Sator Kazakhstan NBFI 
28 ASF Kazakhstan NBFI 
29 Baspana Kazakhstan NBFI 
30 Orda Credit Kazakhstan NBFI 
31 Altyn Orda Kazakhstan NBFI 
32 Abzal Kredit Kazakhstan NBFI 
33 Arbat Kazakhstan NBFI 
34 Moldir Kazakhstan NBFI 
35 Atyrauski Microfinance 
Center 
Kazakhstan NBFI 
36 IMON Tajikistan NBFI 
37 ASTI Tajikistan NBFI 
38 OXUS-TJK Tajikistan NBFI 
39 MDO Arvand Tajikistan NBFI 
40 MLO HUMO Tajikistan NBFI 
41 Borshud Tajikistan NGO 
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42 Agroinvestbank Tajikistan Bank 
43 JOVID Tajikistan NBFI 
44 Bank Eskhata Tajikistan Bank 
45 FINCA-TJK Tajikistan NBFI 
46 MLO Mehnatobod Tajikistan NBFI 
47 Imkoniya Hovar Tajikistan NBFI 
48 FMFB-TJK Tajikistan Bank 
49 Tojsodirotbank Tajikistan Bank 
50 Poenix+ Tajikistan NBFI 
51 Basi Tushum Kyrgyzstan NBFI 
52 Aiyl Bank Kyrgyzstan Bank 
53 FMCC Kyrgyzstan NBFI 
54 Elet-Capital Kyrgyzstan NBFI 
55 Mol Bulak Finance Kyrgyzstan NBFI 
56 CU Timur TSD Kyrgyzstan CU 
57 CU ABN Kyrgyzstan CU 
58 FRP Kyrgyzstan NBFI 
59 Kompanion Kyrgyzstan NBFI 
60 First Microcredit Company Kyrgyzstan NBFI 
61 Agrocredit Plus Kyrgyzstan NGO 
62 OXUS-KGS Kyrgyzstan NBFI 
63 BTA Bank Kyrgyzstan Bank 
64 Mikrokredit Bank Uzbekistan Bank 
65 ASR Uzbekistan CU 
66 Sarbon Uzbekistan CU 
67 Daulet Uzbekistan NGO 
68 FVRM Uzbekistan NGO 
69 Omni Finance Azerbaijan NBFI 
70 Viator Azerbaijan NBFI 
71 AccessBank Azerbaijan Bank 
72 Azercredit Azerbaijan NBFI 
73 Aqroinvest Azerbaijan CU 
74 Azeri Star Azerbaijan NBFI 
75 Normicro Azerbaijan NBFI 
76 KredAqro NBCO Azerbaijan NBFI 
77 FinDev Azerbaijan NBFI 
78 DemirBank Azerbaijan Bank 
79 Komak Credit Azerbaijan CU 
80 Caspian Invest Azerbaijan NBFI 
81 FINCA-AZE Azerbaijan NBFI 
82 Parabank Azerbaijan Bank 
83 Bank of Baku Azerbaijan Bank 
84 TBC Kredit Azerbaijan NBFI 
85 FMFB-AFG Afghanistan Bank 
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86 WWI-AFG Afghanistan NBFI 
87 FINCA-AFG Afghanistan NBFI 
88 OXUS-AFG Afghanistan NBFI 
89 MADRAC Afghanistan NBFI 
90 ASA_AFG Afghanistan NGO 
MFID stands for Microfinance institution identity number. The numbering is the same as in 
the data file, which were used for below analyses. These particular MFIs are chosen due to the 
completeness of the data provided. In other words these MFIs provided more complete data 
relative to the rest of MFIs, which were not included in this study. 
There are 8 MFIs based in China, 6 MFIs based in Mongolia, 21 MFIs based in Kazakhstan, 
13 MFIs based in Kyrgyzstan, 15 MFIs based in Tajikistan, 6 MFIs based in Afghanistan, 16 
MFIs based in Azerbaijan and 5 MFIs based in Uzbekistan included in this study. Of which, 
58 are nonbank financial institutions, 15 are banks, 6 are credit unions and 11 are non-
governmental organizations. 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for NGOs 
Variable Number of 
observations 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
par 61 0.013 0.025 0 0.142 
yield 41 0.269 0.173 0.087 0.761 
roa 55 0.053 0.107 -0.223 0.405 
per_group 42 0.144 0.330 0 0.958 
per_rural 42 0.381 0.446 0 1 
female 59 0.768 0.270 0.165 1 
num_bor 71 5229 10088 53 67241 
ave_size 71 411.12 397.30 0 2911.26 
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for CUs 
Variable Number of 
observations 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
par 31 0.011 0.014 0 0.066 
yield 15 0.320 0.209 0.055 0.711 
roa 24 0.083 0.052 0.001 0.213 
per_group 15 0 0 0 0 
per_rural 15 0.242 0.335 0 1 
female 29 0.356 0.140 0.200 0.658 
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num_bor 31 998 924 24 3052 
ave_size 31 1621.82 785.49 448.38 3375.13 
 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics for NBFIs 
Variable Number of 
observations 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
par 347 0.033 0.064 0 0.477 
yield 219 0.398 0.141 0.053 1.142 
roa 299 0.028 0.147 -1.045 0.365 
per_group 228 0.209 0.340 0 0.998 
per_rural 228 0.236 0.342 0 1 
female 363 0.525 0.221 0.043 1 
num_bor 388 10003 20649 4 137310 
ave_size 387 2579.28 10572.71 0 171473.4 
 
Table 7: Descriptive statistics for Banks 
Variable Number of 
observations 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
par 93 0.034 0.059 0 0.410 
yield 67 0.271 0.089 0.061 0.569 
roa 94 0.025 0.031 -0.078 0.121 
per_group 67 0.037 0.129 0 0.878 
per_rural 67 0.204 0.313 0 1 
female 80 0.331 0.181 0.019 0.898 
num_bor 105 47745 78421 321 411833 
ave_size 103 3775.20 4372.64 19.68 23681.46 
Here will be presented few preliminary findings we see in tables above. There are several 
differences among the types of institutions. First of all, the average portfolio at risk is 
significantly higher in NBFIs and banks. In terms of number of outstanding borrowers CU 
and NGOs are smaller on average. All of the types of institutions offer rural lending. 
Targeting women is the most evident among NGOs. Group lending is provided by NBFIs, 
NGOs and banks. On average the smallest loans are provided by NGOs followed by CUs, 
NBFIs and banks. 
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These countries and MFIs were chosen to be included in the study because of several 
characteristics. Firstly, similar history and economic and political development were 
experienced by these countries. Moreover, microfinance initiatives in these countries are new. 
Introduced in the late 90s of the last century its implementation process had attracted 
significant amount of attention and effort.  
Results 
Estimation of the first empirical model 
We will start with a simple OLS regression, where the dependent variable is Portfolio at 
Risk >30 days and explanatory variables are the percent of group loans, the percent of rural 
loans, the share of women borrowers, dummies for the legal forms, the number of total 
outstanding borrowers, average loan size, yield on gross portfolio, GDP growth rate and GDP 
deflator.  
Table 8: Results of robust OLS regression 
 Dependent variable: par  
Variable Estimated value P-value 
per_group 0.031** 0.037 
per_rural 0.000 0.969 
female -0.001 0.948 
nbfi 0.018*** 0.008 
cu 0.001 0.932 
bank 0.029** 0.038 
num_bor -2.04e-07 0.184 
ave_size 3.52e-06* 0.077 
growth -0.092* 0.081 
inflation -0.051* 0.086 
constant 0.022 0.229 
*** - statistically significant at 1% level 
** - statistically significant at 5% level 
* - statistically significant at 10% level 
Table 9: F-statistic and the coefficient of determination 
 Value 
Number of observations 319 
F(10, 308) 3.71*** 
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P-value 0.000 
R-squared 0.103 
In spite of a relatively small value of coefficient of determination (R-squared = 0.103), F-
statistic of the estimation suggests that the model is significant. That is the null hypothesis 
that  
𝐻𝑜: 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 𝜃1 = 𝜃2 = 𝜃3 = 𝜃4 = 𝛿1 = 𝛿2 = 𝛿3 = 0 
is rejected at 5% level because P-value is well below 0.05. 
Looking at the p-values in the case of per_rural, female, num_bor and cu we cannot reject the 
null hypotheses that individual coefficients of these variables are statistically indifferent from 
null. In other words, on the contrary to the expectations, the percent of rural loans, the percent 
women borrowers and the number of outstanding borrowers do not influence the portfolio risk 
statistically significantly. It is worth noting that while group lending is increasing the portfolio 
risk, rural lending does not increase the risk. This might be a result of stronger bound among 
the rural customers (Wydick (1999)). 
When it comes to the legal form of the microfinance institution credit, having a legal form of 
credit union statistically do not differ from having a form of NGO. Therefore, we should 
check if we can eliminate all these insignificant variables from the model using joint 
significance test. 
The null hypothesis is 
𝐻𝑜: 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 𝜃1 = 𝛿2 = 0 
Using F-test for joint significance of the above variables: 
Table 10: F-test results 
 Value 
F(4, 308) 0.51 
P-value 0.730 
Since the p-value is well above of 0.05, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that these 
variables are jointly in significant in the model.  
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Eliminating insignificant variables result in the following estimation. 
Table 11: Results of robust OLS regression after elimination of insignificant variables 
 Dependent variable: par  
Variable Estimated value P-value 
per_group 0.029* 0.059 
per_rural dropped  
female dropped  
nbfi 0.017*** 0.001 
cu dropped  
bank 0.022*** 0.001 
num_bor dropped  
ave_size 3.94e-06* 0.051 
Growth -0.087* 0.053 
Inflation -0.047 0.102 
Constant 0.019*** 0.002 
*** - statistically significant at 1% level 
** - statistically significant at 5% level 
* - statistically significant at 10% level 
Table 12: F-statistic and the coefficient of determination  
 Value 
Number of observations 336 
F(6, 329) 5.86*** 
P-value 0.000 
R-squared 0.098 
P-value for the F-statistic suggests that model is statistically significant. The coefficient of 
determination has decreased slightly as the number of variables in the model was cut by four. 
From the table above we see that the hypotheses presented at the beginning of this paper were 
not confirmed by this study. The first hypothesis was that the group lending helps decrease 
portfolio risk. The estimate of coefficient on per_group came out positive and statistically 
significant opposed to the expectation that it will be null or slightly negative. One percentage 
increase of share of group loans in the total loan portfolio leads to an increase of portfolio at 
risk >30 days by 0.029 percent. We should be very careful with drawing conclusion here as 
the seemingly positive group lending to risk relationship can be a mere result of the selection 
of borrowers for the group lending. It is important to note that microfinance clients differ in 
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terms of their economic background. Some households are very poor while some are rather 
poor but owns assets. Group lending is usually used when there is very little or no assets that 
can be used as collateral. So the microfinance institutions might choose these borrowers to 
form groups, within which all other member of the same group will be responsible for the 
repayment by one of the borrowers. The selection is also done on the borrowers’ side as well. 
Group lending is costly for the borrowers because one has to attend meetings and also pay 
attention to the activities of other group members in order not be forced to repay for them. 
Thus a borrower will choose an individual loan if he or she can. All these selections might 
mean that the borrowers, who are receiving loans through a group, are the poorest of the all 
and have no other alternative. Therefore, group lenders are inherently riskier than the 
individual lenders are. In other words, it can be that group lending does not raise the level of 
risk in microfinance institutions and the estimation is only reflecting the fact group lenders are 
riskier. In addition, it can be a mere proof of very poor borrowers receiving group loans. 
Therefore, it is important in the next step to study how much group lending is decreasing the 
default risk, if it does, in very poor borrowers compared to hypothetical default risk of 
individual loans among these borrowers. 
Based on empirical research, D’Espallier, Guérin, And Mersland (2011) came to a conclusion 
that repayment rate of women borrowers is higher. However, both variables female and 
per_rural are not statistically significant in this model when controlled for other variables. 
According to this, targeting women population and lending in the rural areas do not seem to 
have impact on the risk of loan portfolio. That is the statement women are more reliable 
borrowers and rural customers are less reliable borrowers in terms of repayment rate was not 
confirmed by this study. However, the differences, if any, may be reflected in the earning 
performance (interest rate) of MFIs. That is because the risk of higher default risk of risky 
groups (men borrowers and rural borrowers) may be addressed by MFIs through increased 
effort in monitoring/collecting the loans, which can be evident in the increased expenses and 
thus in lower profits. 
The hypothesis that the microfinance institutions with a bigger base of outstanding borrowers 
should be able to better diversify and thus should have a lower level of portfolio risk was not 
confirmed. It appears that the number of borrowers does not seem to affect MFIs’ ability to 
manage the default risk of borrowers. Moreover, having a legal entity of NGO or CU does not 
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seem influence their portfolio risk. That may be because they are serving relatively small and 
closed groups of people.  
Interestingly, NBFIs and banks have a higher portfolio risk on average. This seems to be 
somewhat opposing the hypothesis that NBFIs and NGO should have better governance, 
which should result in a better management of loan portfolio. NBFIs have on average 0.017 
percentage points higher PAR>30 in comparison to NGOs, whereas banks have 0.022 
percentage points higher PAR>30. It appears that the more commercial an institution becomes 
the bigger portfolio risk becomes. However, the bigger value of PAR>30 does not necessarily 
mean that the portfolio management is worse than in other forms of MFIs. In fact it can be 
that NGOs might be committing unnecessarily to a level of risk, which is too low.  
At last, as expected both growth rate and inflation (however, with relatively low levels of 
confidence) seem to be facilitating the ability of the borrowers to repay, which resulting in a 
lower level of risk of portfolio. Growth was also found to be facilitating the performance of 
MFIs through a lower level of default by Ahlin, Lin and Maio (2011).  
Using a link test in STATA we can tell how well the model fits the data. This simple test of 
model fit is a regression of the dependent variable on the prediction and the square of 
prediction. If the model is specified correctly, then the coefficient on the prediction should be 
close to 1 and the coefficient for the square of prediction should not be statistically 
significant. In other words, the square of prediction should have no explanatory power. The 
following table contains the result of the link test. 
Table 13: Test for misspecification 
 Dependent variable: par  
Variable Estimated value P-value 
𝑝𝑎?̂? 1.034** 0.021 
𝑝𝑎?̂?2 -0.456 0.936 
constant -0.000 0.957 
𝑝𝑎?̂? is the prediction of par and 𝑝𝑎?̂?2 is the square of prediction. As we can see from the 
table, the null hypothesis that the coefficient for the prediction squared is equal to zero cannot 
be rejected. In other words the model fit test suggests the model is correctly specified. 
Estimation of the second empirical model 
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The second model to be studied in this research looks as follows: 
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑒𝑟_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑒𝑟_𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + δ1𝑛𝑏𝑓𝑖𝑖 + δ2𝑐𝑢𝑖
+ δ3𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 + 𝜃1𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑎𝑣𝑒_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃4𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
Independent variables of this model are the same as in the first model. Only the dependent 
variable is yield instead of par. The variable yield stands for the earning performance of 
individual MFI, which is expressed by the yield of the gross loan portfolio. However even it is 
called portfolio yield, it is more of lending related revenue expressing the earning 
performance of a MFI. Yield is used in this study together with PAR>30 and ROA so that we 
can tell apart what kind of effect individual methods have. 
 In the following table is presented the estimation of the model. 
Table 14: Results of robust OLS estimation 
 Dependent variable: yield  
Variable Estimated value P-value 
per_group 0.055** 0.020 
per_rural -0.059** 0.020 
female 0.122*** 0.001 
nbfi 0.152*** 0.000 
cu 0.119** 0.049 
bank 0.087*** 0.008 
num_bor -4.13e-07*** 0.007 
ave_size -9.65e-06*** 0.001 
growth -0.248** 0.035 
inflation 0.236*** 0.001 
constant 0.198*** 0.000 
*** - statistically significant at 1% level 
** - statistically significant at 5% level 
* - statistically significant at 10% level 
A more clear/direct relationship is evident in the model above. The coefficients of all 
variables are statistically significant.  
Table 15: F-statistic and the coefficient of determination 
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 Value 
Number of observations 311 
F(10, 300) 19.79*** 
P-value 0.000 
R-squared 0.267 
According to the F-statistic the model is significant and explains 26.7 percent of the variation 
in the dependent variable. With respect to the number of observation the coefficient of 
determination is acceptable.  
Table 16: Test for misspecification 
 Dependent variable: yield  
Variable Estimated value P-value 
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙?̂? 0.916 0.206 
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙?̂?2 0.120 0.907 
constant 0.014 0.911 
From the table we can see that the null hypothesis that the coefficient for the prediction 
squared is equal to zero cannot be rejected (p-value=0.907). Thus link test above suggests that 
the model is specified correctly. Therefore we can now go to the individual variables and 
interpret the result. 
Hypotheses, which were made, seem to be confirmed partially at this point. The coefficient 
for the variable per_group is statistically significant and different from zero, which means 
that this variable is relevant in explaining the earning performance. It suggests that an increase 
in the share of group loans in the whole portfolio by 1 percentage point leads to an increase in 
the yield of the gross loan portfolio by 0.055 percentage points. In other words, group loans 
appear to produce higher revenue than then individual loan at this point. This may be done 
through higher interest. However, one should note that this higher revenue is coming at the 
cost of higher portfolio risk (please refer to the results of the first estimation).  
From the first estimation the contribution of risk to the rural households and male borrowers 
to the portfolio risk was not evident. However, from the model above we see that lending to 
the rural areas seems to be decreasing the earning performance of MFIs according to the OLS 
estimate. On average an increase in the share of rural loans by 1 percentage point lead to a 
decrease of the yield of the gross loan portfolio by 0.059 percentage point. Also, lending to 
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women borrowers seems to increase the yield, which again seems to be elevated interest rates 
for this group. 
The hypothesis that NBFIs, CUs and banks should perform better in comparison to NGOs in 
terms of ability to produce revenue was confirmed in this study. On average banks have 8.7 
percent higher, CUs 11.8 percent higher and NBFIs 15.2 percent higher yield of the gross loan 
portfolio. One of the reasons of current transformation of NGOs to these types of institutions 
seems to be earning performance, which is easier to achieve with good governance.  
The estimated model suggests that with an increase of number of borrowers average yield 
decreases. Moreover, it seems that the bigger the loans grow the lower the yield of the gross 
loan portfolio becomes. It is possible that with the growth of size loans and the number of 
borrowers microfinance institutions might be forced to compete with conventional bank and 
this fact might be making MFIs act more like conventional banks. However, this can true only 
given that conventional banking sector has lower interest rates.  
It is also interesting that with the growth of the economy the yield of the gross loan portfolio 
decreases and vice versa. Under assumption that the performance of these local economies is 
positively correlated with the global economy, this result seems to be in line with the findings 
of Janda and Svárovská (2012). These authors point out that returns on investment in 
microfinance investment funds are not positively correlated with returns on the market 
portfolio. 
Estimation of the third model 
The variable ROA is chosen because as the final measure of financial performance of an 
organization it captures more details in comparison to PAR>30 and yield. For instance, the 
risk of portfolio may be controlled through different measures and methodologies. However, 
at the end elevated effort will be visible on ROA. In other words third model is used to create 
a more complete picture of the MFI activities. 
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𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑒𝑟_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑒𝑟_𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + δ1𝑛𝑏𝑓𝑖𝑖 + δ2𝑐𝑢𝑖
+ δ3𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 + 𝜃1𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑎𝑣𝑒_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃4𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
Only dependent variable is changed to ROA and the independent variables stay the same as in 
the first two models. We should be able to see from the result how expensive individual 
methods are and how the rest of the variables affects the profitability. The table below 
contains the OLS estimates. 
Table 17: Results of robust OLS estimation 
 Dependent variable: roa  
Variable Estimated value P-value 
per_group -0.027 0.240 
per_rural 0.011 0.523 
female 0.037 0.354 
nbfi -0.027 0.240 
cu 0.022 0.389 
bank -0.033 0.176 
num_bor 2.58e-07 0.193 
ave_size 3.30e-06** 0.045 
growth 0.053 0.504 
inflation 0.228*** 0.002 
constant -0.016 0.701 
*** - statistically significant at 1% level 
** - statistically significant at 5% level 
* - statistically significant at 10% level 
A more clear/direct relationship is evident in the model above. The coefficients of all 
variables are statistically significant.  
Table 18: F-statistic and the coefficient of determination 
 Value 
Number of observations 312 
F(10, 300) 2.98 
P-value 0.058 
R-squared 0.121 
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According to the F-statistic the model is not statistically significant at a 0.05 level. All 
coefficients except average loan size and inflation are statistically no different from zero. In 
the following section the model will be estimated using different techniques. At this point 
positive relationships exit between ROA and average loan size or inflation. 
Estimation of the models using panel data techniques 
At this point we should recall that the data being used in this chapter is actually panel data. 
Panel data is a dataset in which entities are observed across time. My data consist of 90 
entities, for which exist observations (though incomplete) over the period from 1998 to 2011. 
In other words, it is a combination of times series for each of the observed entities. Up to this 
point, the analyses were carried out using OLS regression, which treats each observation as 
individual observation ignoring the time series property. The OLS regression used in this way 
is called pooled OLS regression. However, this may be inefficient use of data as the main 
advantage of panel data is the fact that unobservable variables and factors can be controlled 
for given that they are significant. These unobservable factors can be, for instance, corporate 
cultural differences among MFIs, some aspects of corporate governance, the public image of a 
certain institution, or a relationship with sponsors and regulatory bodies i.e. factors specific to 
an individual MFI. The common techniques of panel data are fixed effects model and random 
effects model. These techniques will be briefly introduced in the following text and will be 
followed by the estimation results for both theoretical models using random and fixed effect 
models. 
Fixed effect model should be used when we believe that there are some time-invariant 
unobserved variables which have impact on independent variables. Fixed effect model can 
help us better explore the relationship between dependent and independent variables within a 
microfinance institution. Each institution has its own individual characteristics that may 
influence the independent variables e.g. the business practices of a certain microfinance 
institution may lead the borrower act more responsible or less responsible resulting in a higher 
or lower rate of default. It is worth noting assumption behind this model is that these 
characteristics are specific to an institution and time-invariant. In other words each institution 
is different, thus the error term and the constant which capture these characteristics should not 
be correlated with the each others. Fixed effect model removes the effect of those time-
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invariant characteristics from the explaining variables so we can assess the effect of the 
explaining variables on the dependent variable.  
In addition to the rationale behind fixed effect model, random effect model assumes that the 
variation across institutions is random and uncorrelated with the explaining variables included 
in the model. In other words, unobserved effects of institutions are not explainable by the 
independent variables in the model. Therefore, in contrast to fixed effect model unobserved 
effect is entered as an explaining variable in random effect model. The table below contains 
the estimates of the coefficient of all models using random and fixed effects. 
Table 19: Random effect and fixed effect models 
 Dependent variable: par Dependent variable: 
yield 
Dependent variable: roa 
 Random 
effect 
Fixed 
effect 
Random 
effect 
Fixed 
effect 
Random 
effect 
Fixed effect 
Dependent 
variables 
Estimate 
(P-value) 
Estimate 
(P-value) 
Estimate 
(P-value) 
Estimate 
(P-value) 
Estimate 
(P-value) 
Estimate 
(P-value) 
per_group 0.034* 
(0.065) 
0.037* 
(0.062) 
0.022 
(0.401) 
0.017 
(0.549) 
0.001 
(0.958) 
0.006 
(0.761) 
per_rural 0.004 
(0.684) 
0.005 
(0.605) 
-0.011 
(0.534) 
-0.002 
(0.929) 
-0.012 
(0.450) 
-0.021 
(0.200) 
female 0.017 
(0.598) 
0.051 
(0.393) 
0.270*** 
(0.001) 
0.302*** 
(0.006) 
0.124*** 
(0.004) 
0.204*** 
(0.000) 
nbfi 0.026* 
(0.061) 
Omitted 0.183*** 
(0.005) 
Omitted -0.025 
(0.549) 
Omitted 
cu 0.008 
(0.707) 
Omitted 0.211* 
(0.087) 
Omitted 0.062 
(0.376) 
Omitted 
bank 0.045* 
(0.058) 
Omitted 0.158** 
(0.030) 
Omitted -0.016 
(0.756) 
Omitted 
num_bor -1.65e-07 
(0.210) 
-2.5e-07 
(0.141) 
-6.95e-07* 
(0.075) 
-7.26e-07 
(0.229) 
4.82e-07* 
(0.060) 
8.17e-07** 
(0.013) 
ave_size 3.03e-06 
(0.293) 
3.19e-06 
(0.564) 
-9.30e-
06*** 
(0.008) 
-12.1e-
06*** 
(0.009) 
7.14e-
06** 
(0.019) 
 
9.63e-06 
** 
(0.017) 
growth -0.080 
(0.161) 
-0.077 
(0.277) 
-0.113 
(0.231) 
-0.085 
(0.389) 
0.125* 
(0.092) 
0.144* 
(0.062) 
inflation -0.046 
(0.147) 
-0.045 
(0.209) 
0.059* 
(0.084) 
0.035 
(0.299) 
0.073 
(0.103) 
0.041 
(0.372) 
Constant 0.006 0.009 0.099 0.241*** -0.070 -0.124*** 
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(0.809) (0.704) (0.230) (0.000) (0.166) (0.000) 
Observation 319 319 311 311 312 312 
Number of 
groups 
76 76 76 76 74 74 
Wald chi2 / 
F test 
29.72 2.08 132.77 5.55 23.91 4.16 
P-value 0.001 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 
*** - statistically significant at 1% level 
** - statistically significant at 5% level 
* - statistically significant at 10% level 
Omitted – omitted due to collinearity 
The decision whether random effects or fixed effects should be used is made using Hausman 
test. The null hypothesis of Hausman test is that the preferred model is random effects 
opposed to the alternative hypothesis that fixed effect model should be used.  
Table 20: Hausman test for the first model 
Dependent variable: par 
Hausman test 4.06 
P-value 0.541 
Since the p-value is way above the significance level of 0.05, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the preferred model is the random effect model. In other words, for the model, 
where the portfolio risk is explained, is suitable random effects technique. 
Table 21: Hausman test for the second model 
Dependent variable: yield 
Hausman test 19.23 
P-value 0.002 
At a 0.05 significance level, we reject the null hypothesis that the preferred model is random 
effects model in favor of alternative hypothesis that the fixed-effects model is preferred. 
Therefore, we should choose the fixed effects model for the case where the variable yield 
figures as the dependent variable.  
Table 22: Hausman test for the third model 
Dependent variable: roa 
Hausman test 24.81 
P-value 0.000 
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At a 0.05 significance level, we can reject the null hypothesis that the preferred model is 
random effects model in favor of alternative hypothesis that the fixed-effects model is 
preferred. Therefore, we should choose the fixed effects model here. 
In the following table we will see the result of pooled OLS compared to the estimates 
obtained using panel data techniques. 
Table 23: Comparison of pooled OLS and fixed-effects/random effects model 
 Dependent variable: par Dependent variable: 
yield 
Dependent variable: 
roa 
 Pooled 
OLS 
Random 
effect 
Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
effect 
Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
effect 
Dependent 
variables 
Estimate 
(P-value) 
Estimate 
(P-value) 
Estimate 
(P-value) 
Estimate 
(P-value) 
Estimate 
(P-value) 
Estimate 
(P-value) 
per_group 0.029* 
(0.059) 
0.034* 
(0.065) 
0.055** 
(0.020) 
0.017 
(0.549) 
-0.027 
(0.240) 
0.006 
(0.761) 
per_rural Dropped 0.004 
(0.684) 
-0.059** 
(0.020) 
-0.002 
(0.929) 
0.011 
(0.523) 
-0.021 
(0.200) 
female Dropped 0.017 
(0.598) 
0.122*** 
(0.001) 
0.302*** 
(0.006) 
0.037 
(0.354) 
0.204*** 
(0.000) 
nbfi 0.017*** 
(0.001) 
0.026* 
(0.061) 
0.152*** 
(0.000) 
Omitted -0.026 
(0.160) 
Omitted 
cu Dropped 0.008 
(0.707) 
0.119** 
(0.049) 
Omitted 0.022 
(0.389) 
Omitted 
bank 0.022*** 
(0.001) 
0.045* 
(0.058) 
0.087*** 
(0.008) 
Omitted -0.033 
(0.176) 
Omitted 
num_bor Dropped -1.65e-07 
(0.210) 
-4.13e-
07*** 
(0.007) 
-7.26e-07 
(0.229) 
2.58e-07 
(0.193) 
8.17e-
07** 
(0.013) 
ave_size 3.94e-06* 
(0.051) 
3.03e-06 
(0.293) 
-9.65e-
06*** 
(0.001) 
-12.1e-
06*** 
(0.009) 
3.30e-
06** 
(0.045) 
9.63e-06 
** 
(0.017) 
growth -0.087* 
(0.053) 
-0.080 
(0.161) 
-0.248** 
(0.035) 
-0.085 
(0.389) 
0.053 
(0.504) 
0.144* 
(0.062) 
inflation -0.047 
(0.102) 
-0.046 
(0.147) 
0.236*** 
(0.001) 
0.035 
(0.299) 
0.228*** 
(0.002) 
0.041 
(0.372) 
Constant 0.019*** 
(0.002) 
0.006 
(0.809) 
0.198*** 
(0.000) 
0.241*** 
(0.000) 
-0.016 
(0.701) 
-0.124*** 
(0.000) 
observation 336 319 311 311 312 312 
Number of 
groups 
 76  76  74 
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Wald chi2 / F 
test 
5.86 29.72 19.79 5.55 2.98 4.16 
P-value 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.058 0.000 
For the model where the dependent variable is par estimates come out similar to each other 
for both techniques. All the variables which came out significant in OLS regression are also 
significant in the random effects model. Also the sign of all these variables are the same 
regardless of the estimation technique. Coefficients of the variables except variable ave_size, 
growth and inflation are relatively higher in magnitude in the case of random effects model. 
Therefore, all the conclusions drawn based on the result of OLS remain valid. 
In the case of model where the dependent variable is yield again all the signs are the same for 
both fixed-effects and OLS. However, fixed-effects model returns that coefficient on the 
variables per_group, per_rural and num_bor are not significantly different from zero. These 
findings suggest that there were unobserved time-invariant variables specific to each MFIs, 
which resulted in the previous significance of variables per_group, per_rural and num_bor. 
The magnitude of the significant variables has also grown here. For instance, the coefficient 
for the female borrowers has increased from 0.122 to 0.302, which means the previous 
conclusion regarding targeting women remains the same. However, we now know that group 
loans and rural lending do not influence the yield. This means that group lending is despite its 
increased risk does not lead to a higher yield of the gross loan portfolio. In other words, group 
loan does not appear to be effective. When it comes to the rural lending, the insignificant 
coefficient actually works in its favor. It suggests that rural lending does not decrease the 
yield of the gross loan portfolio. This finding with previous finding that rural lending has no 
impact on the risk level suggests that the set of microfinance methodologies used in rural 
lending might be effective. However, we should wait for the impact of per_rural on ROA. At 
last we should note one disadvantage of fixed-effects model. That is the fact that we cannot 
study the impact of the legal form on the yield of the gross loan portfolio. Dummy variables 
used for this are omitted due to collinearity and the effect is absorbed by the individual 
interceptions of each institutions.  
With the application of panel data technique the third model now looks statistically 
significant. Group lending and rural lending does not actually influence the profitability of the 
MFIs. This means that the study was not able to confirm that group lending differs from 
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individual lending in terms of final profitability. However, group lending appears to be 
increasing the risk of loan portfolio, which leads to a conclusion that it is actually ineffective. 
In contrast rural lending seems to have no effect on the risk, revenue and ROA. Thus it 
implies that it is actually indifferent from individual loan in urban areas. The conclusion is the 
rural lending is more effective then group lending partially thanks to higher social cohesion in 
the rural communities. 
Targeting women seems to increase the profitability. Therefore, with previous findings it can 
be said that women bear less risk of default. However, when taken into account the findings 
that no effect on the default risk, higher yield and profitability, it may suggested that MFIs are 
actually making use of the low level of default risk of women by increasing the interest rate 
charged to women to the point where default risk equals that of men. 
Coefficients on the number of borrowers and average loan size in the third model suggest that 
increasing number of borrows and loan size actually helps cut the costs significantly. 
Results 
We can close this paper by drawing conclusion for the studied region. Firstly, we are not able 
to draw a complete conclusion based on the legal entity forms. And the answer to the question 
of whether microfinance methodologies are effective is somewhat mixed. The hypothesis that 
the group lending decreases the portfolio risk in comparison to individual lending was not 
confirmed. This may be caused by the selection of type of loan by the borrowers and the 
lenders. Another finding is that targeting women and lending to the rural communities do not 
seem to increase the portfolio risk. Moreover, targeting women does increase the yield of the 
gross loan portfolio confirming that the men borrowers are worse deals for MFIs. In fact 
targeting women seems to work well as a tool of producing higher portfolio yield. In contrast 
rural lending does not seem influence the portfolio yield.  At last it was found that group 
lending and rural lending does not influence the profitability measured by ROA. That is apart 
from the fact that these methodologies do not influence the portfolio yield they seem to have 
no influence on the expense side as well. Only targeting the women borrowers appears to be 
contributing to the profitability of MFIs. When these findings put together, targeting women 
and rural lending seem to be effective in contrast to group lending which appears ineffective. 
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